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Sanford C. Goldberg [79]Sanford Charles Goldberg [1]
  1. Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...)
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  2. Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.
    It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology—in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship would require one to give a friend the benefit of the doubt, and thereby come to believe something in violation of ordinary epistemic standards on justified or responsible belief :329–351, 2004; Stroud in Ethics 116:498–524, 2006; Hazlett in A luxury of the understanding: on the value of true belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). (...)
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  3. What is a speaker owed?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2022 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (3):375-407.
    Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 3, Page 375-407, Summer 2022.
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  4. Epistemically engineered environments.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2783-2802.
    In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they “tell” us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length, I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be (...)
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  5.  58
    Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
    Sanford C. Goldberg explores the source, nature, and scope of the normative expectations we have of one another as we engage in conversation. He examines two fundamental types of expectation -- epistemic and interpersonal -- that are generated by the performance of speech acts themselves.
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  6. On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.
    Elsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of (...)
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  7. Attitude in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  8. Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...)
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  9. On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1641-1658.
    In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. (...)
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  10. Interpersonal epistemic entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
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  11. Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa, The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44.
     
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  12. Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...)
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  13. What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4407-4423.
    The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in particular knowledge communities. (...)
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  14.  83
    Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon their (...)
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  15. Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.
    This paper reviews recent philosophical work on assertion, with a special focus on work exploring the theme of assertion's norm. It concludes with a brief section characterizing several open questions that might profitably be explored from this perspective.
     
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  16.  99
    What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12541-12559.
    The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.
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  17.  64
    Normative Expectations in Epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):83-104.
    There are all sorts of normative expectations in epistemology—expectations about the epistemic condition of other subjects—that would appear to be relevant to epistemic assessment in ways that do not conform to epistemic standards as traditionally understood. The expectations in question include expectations of inquiries pursued or completed, expectations of certain competences, professional expectations, expectations of having consulted with experts, institutional expectations, moral expectations, expectations of friends, and so forth. My goals in this paper are two. First, I aim to highlight (...)
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  18. II- Arrogance, Silence, and Silencing.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):93-112.
    Alessandra Tanesini’s insightful paper explores the moral and epistemic harms of arrogance, particularly in conversation. Of special interest to her is the phenomenon of arrogance-induced silencing, whereby one speaker’s arrogance either prevents another from speaking altogether or else undermines her capacity to produce certain speech acts such as assertions. I am broadly sympathetic to many of Tanesini’s claims about the harms associated with this sort of silencing. In this paper I propose to address what I see as a lacuna in (...)
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  19. The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
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  20. Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen, Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
  21. Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):364-383.
    In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.
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  22.  84
    Coherence in Science: A Social Approach.Sanford C. Goldberg & Kareem Khalifa - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3489-3509.
    Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those _within_ an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist (...)
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  23. Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
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  24. Self‐ascription, Self‐knowledge, and the Memory Argument.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  25. Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):178-203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  26.  74
    The Asymmetry Thesis and the Doctrine of Normative Defeat.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):339-352.
    It is widely considered a truism that the only evidence that can provide justification for one's belief that p is evidence in one's possession. At the same time, a good many epistemologists accept another claim seemingly in tension with this "truism," to the effect that evidence not in one's possession can defeat or undermine the justification for one's belief that p. Anyone who accepts both of these claims accepts what I will call the asymmetry thesis: while evidence in one's possession (...)
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  27. Testimonially based knowledge from false testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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  28.  76
    Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.
    According to anti‐reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption (...)
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  29.  46
    Illocutionary Force, Speech Act Norms, and the Coordination and Mutuality of Conversational Expectations.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2023 - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz, Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 2147483647-2147483647.
    Marina Sbisà has long advocated that we think of the illocutionary force of a speech act in terms of the act’s (predictable) systematic effects on the normative relationship between a speaker and her audience. Building on this idea, I argue that the hypothesis of distinctive speech act norms can be used to explain how participants in a conversation coordinate the normative expectations they have of one another in conversation. Such an explanation earns its keep by explaining how speakers render themselves (...)
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  30. Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
  31.  82
    The Promise and Pitfalls of Online ‘Conversations’.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:177-193.
    Good conversations are one of the great joys of life. Online ‘conversations’ rarely seem to make the grade. In this paper I use some tools from philosophy in an attempt to illuminate what might be going wrong.
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  32. On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
  33. Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  34.  40
    What do you know when you know your own thoughts?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli, New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  35. Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
    This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic (...)
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  36.  62
    Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages.Alessandro Capone, Una Stojnic, Ernie Lepore, Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul, Gaetano Fiorin, Kenneth A. Taylor, Jonathan Berg, Herbert L. Colston, Sanford C. Goldberg, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Cliff Goddard, Anna Wierzbicka, Magdalena Sztencel, Sarah E. Duffy, Alessandra Falzone, Paola Pennisi, Péter Furkó, András Kertész, Ágnes Abuczki, Alessandra Giorgi, Sona Haroutyunian, Marina Folescu, Hiroko Itakura, John C. Wakefield, Hung Yuk Lee, Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Brian E. Butler, Douglas Robinson, Kobie van Krieken, José Sanders, Grazia Basile, Antonino Bucca, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri & Kobie van Krieken (eds.) - 2018 - Springer Verlag.
    This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed picture of indirect reports in the world’s languages and their significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an empirical (...)
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  37. Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  38. Semantic externalism and epistemic illusions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg, Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 235--252.
     
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  39. Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):157-170.
    In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our (...)
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  40.  58
    Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (11):3017-3035.
    Several influential thought experiments from Harman 1973 purport to show that unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge. Recently, some epistemologists have appealed to these thought experiments in defense of a logically stronger thesis: unpossessed evidence can defeat justification. But these appeals fail to appreciate that Harman himself thought of his examples as Gettier cases, and so would have rejected this strengthening of his thesis. On the contrary, he would have held that while unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge, it leaves justification intact. (...)
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  41.  39
    Epistemic negligence: between performance and evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    At first blush, Sosa’s performance-based approach to epistemic normativity would seem to put us in a position to illuminate important types of epistemic negligence – types whose epistemic significance will be denied by standard evidentialist theories. But while Sosa’s theory does indeed venture beyond standard evidentialism, it fails to provide an adequate account of epistemic negligence. The challenge arises in cases in which a subject is negligent in that she knowingly fails to perform inquiries which it was her responsibility to (...)
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  42.  99
    Telling and the reasons of testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):708-714.
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  43. The Epistemology of Silence.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock, Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 243--261.
     
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  44. Testimony as Evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2).
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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  45. Fake News and Epistemic Rot; or, Why We Are All in This Together.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann, The Epistemology of Fake News. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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  46. Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and knowledge of content: reply to Brueckner.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):212-217.
  47.  40
    Lackey on the Epistemology of Group Agents.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (4):811-824.
    In this paper I argue that treating organized groups as agents, in the way Lackey proposes to do, has implications that are more far-reaching than appears to be recognized in Lackey’s book itself. To bring this out I discuss (1) the epistemic significance of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, (2) a potential counterexample to her Group Epistemic Agent account of group justification, and (3) the bearing of group agency (as understood by Lackey) on the scope of the domain of group epistemology. (...)
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  48.  57
    Skepticism and Inquiry.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):304-324.
    In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish the reasons for doubting whether p, one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that is sufficient to undermine the (...)
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  49. What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco, Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
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  50.  86
    Testimonial Reliance.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (7):2683-2702.
    Forming a belief on the basis of accepting another’s testimony often involves a kind of reliance on the (say-so of the) testifier. I argue that this reliance has epistemically relevant features that cannot be represented in most mainstream theories in the epistemology of testimony. The targeted views are those that embrace individualism about testimonial justification.
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